

community composed primarily of low-income housing developments, she changed the lives of many individuals; however, her work with families and groups had a widespread and lasting impact on the entire community. The Abelson lectures on family relationships attracted a large grassroots audience.

Through her work with individuals and the general community Ms. Abelson established a base of trust which made her a very influential and productive force in the embryonic Brownsville anti-poverty program. Evelyn convened the Brownsville Professional Group composed of a cross-section of professionals who worked in the community. The blue-print for the Brownsville Community Action Plan was launched when this group convened a body of local leaders who formed the Brownsville Community Council.

Mr. Speaker, as a local Branch Librarian of the Brooklyn Public Library and later as a Library Community Coordinator, I worked with Ms. Abelson to develop the Brownsville Total Action Plan which began with the election of a Board of Directors for the Brownsville Community Council. For that first election and for many others Ms. Abelson was a one woman Election Commission whose results were never challenged.

Ms. Abelson later established a Community Mental Health Clinic in Brownsville. While her professional work expanded and provided greater support for many more families, she continued in her role as a guiding community activist and policy advisor. In my changing careers from Library Community Coordinator, to Brownsville Community Council Executive Director, to Commissioner of the New York City Community Action Program to New York State Senator and finally to the United States Congress I have steadfastly relied on Evelyn Abelson's unique ability to maintain one open ear for the voice of the people on the bottom while the other ear listened and interpreted the sweep of local, national and international developments.

For this rare mixture of personal warmth, abiding compassion and generosity, as well as a penetrating mind anchored by experience and wisdom, it is appropriate that we honor Evelyn Abelson as a great American Point-of-Light.

**IKE SKELTON: A MAN OF VISION,  
A MAN OF COMPASSION, A MAN  
OF THE WORLD**

**HON. SAM FARR**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

*Tuesday, June 15, 1999*

Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Speaker, I was honored recently to have our friend and colleague, IKE SKELTON, visit my district in California. This gentleman, the Ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, is known to all of us as a man of intensity but earnestness, a man of determination but flexibility, a man of integrity above all else.

Congressman SKELTON was visiting the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, the Navy's premier school for advanced technical, engineering, and strategic education. He was

there to address the student body of the challenges they face as military leaders in an increasingly complex geopolitical world community. While at the school, he was presented with an Honorary Degree of Doctor of Military Sciences.

I was so impressed with the lecture Mr. SKELTON presented and the citation by the NPS Provost, Richard Elster, of Mr. SKELTON'S achievements, I feel compelled to share them with this body. I urge everyone to take the time to read these remarks and consider their meaning, especially as we struggle here with foreign affairs and military and defense questions in a troubled world.

**REMARKS ACCOMPANYING AWARD OF DEGREE  
OF DOCTOR OF MILITARY SCIENCES TO THE  
HONORABLE IKE SKELTON**

(Made by NPS Provost, Richard Elster)

Under the authority vested by law and with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Postgraduate School is pleased to award the Degree of Doctor of Military Sciences to the Honorable Ike Skelton, Representative of the Fourth District of the State of Missouri to the Congress of the United States.

Representative Skelton understands the relationship between the nation's security and the maintenance of strong, robust armed forces. He has consistently, and effectively, used every means at his disposal to ensure that the national security policy of the United States recognizes the preeminent role of the armed forces and that the Congress provides resources to the Department of Defense and the military departments accordingly.

Representative Skelton's regard for the military extends far beyond national security imperatives to genuine, heart-felt concern for the well being of every man and woman in uniform. He understands the fundamental relationship between maintaining the most powerful Armed Forces the world has ever known and the education, training, talent, and morale of the individuals who comprise those forces. As Chairman of the Military Personnel and Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, he systematically advanced initiatives to improve the quality of life and opportunities of military personnel. He supported military pay increases and sought to secure acceptance of the principle that military compensation should be comparable to that of the private sector. He oversaw improvements in military health care and attempted to secure a uniform benefit for all eligible personnel, both active duty and retired. In addition, he offered the amendment that repealed the combat exclusion for women on Navy ships.

Representative Skelton has also demonstrated that a true friend of the armed forces will recognize problems and insist that they be corrected even in the face of strong objections from the civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense. In the early 1980s, he became convinced that the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commands was fundamentally flawed. He was one of a handful of legislators who drafted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Consequently, history will record that he was instrumental in framing one of the three most significant laws relating to national security since the American Revolution.

As chairman of the Panel on Military Education, Representative Skelton contributed

immeasurably to improvements in professional military education. His panel found that the officer corps needs more military strategists and that every officer should understand strategy. An avid student of history, Representative Skelton insisted that staff and war colleges strengthen and expand the study of military history and other subjects related to the development of strategic thinking. Under his leadership, the Panel also effected curriculum changes that greatly enhanced joint military education and raised the academic standards of the schools.

Representative Skelton continues to exercise great influence over the direction of military education. He has recognized the compelling need for the officer corps to be capable of meeting the challenges resulting from the myriad technological changes that are altering the way wars will be fought in the future. In early 1998, he called upon the Naval Postgraduate School to develop a new paradigm for professional military education, one that would integrate technical and traditional subjects into a single coherent professional military education course of studies.

Representative Skelton has made other significant contributions to national security too numerous to detail. Years before the current crisis, he urged that additional attention and resources be devoted to recruiting. He has consistently advocated better utilization of the reserve components. He has advanced original proposals for modifying the force structure of the services to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War period.

In summary, Representative Skelton has made seminal contributions to military affairs in the latter quarter of the Twentieth Century. He epitomizes the ideal linkage that should exist between Americans and their Armed Forces in a democratic republic animated by a strong tradition of civilian control of the military.

It is an honor to award an honorary doctorate to an American of such singular distinction. Congratulations Mr. Skelton.

**REMARKS OF REP. IKE SKELTON, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, APRIL 19, 1999, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

Today, I want to talk to you about the role of Congress in carrying out its Constitutional mandate with respect to the armed forces. Many people do not know that the Constitution—in Article I, Section 8—gives Congress the power “To raise and support armies, . . .” and “To provide and maintain a navy.” Fewer still know that Article I, Section 8, further gives Congress the power “To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;”. Article II of the Constitution designates the President as “commander in chief of the army and navy . . .”, but no specific authority is granted. Many in the Department of Defense, both military and civilian, are often uncomfortable with what they regard as “Congressional interference” in national security affairs. But the system works—the Constitution make Congress the link between the American people and the military whose mission it is to protect them. And, thus, it helps ensure that there is public support for the military.

Let me give you the history of two areas, which will show you the system working at its best—The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and Professional Military Education, commonly known as PME. These two areas are of professional interest to you, and as some of you may know, I was directly involved in Congressional efforts in both of these areas.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

Around the time I began my service in Congress—the late 1970's and early 1980's—the U.S. military experienced a long series of substandard operational performances, including a number of failures and some disasters: Vietnam, Pueblo, Mayaguez, Desert One, Beirut, and Grenada.

In the wake of these events, it became clear to a number of Members of Congress, including me, that something was wrong and that a solution needed to be found. I began meeting with our military leaders, both active and retired, to discuss the state of our military and determine what Congress could do to help fix the problems. Indeed, it was not just a question of Congress wanting to help fix the problems. As I mentioned earlier, it was our responsibility under the Constitution to fix the problems.

Among those I met with was a fellow Missourian, General Maxwell Taylor, the Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division at Normandy, and a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Well in his 80's by the time I talked to him, but still every inch a soldier, General Taylor shared with me the perspectives he had gained in his long, illustrious military career, both in combat and staff assignments. It was General Taylor who first raised with me the issue or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as critical to solving the problems in our armed forces.

When other distinguished military leaders and thinkers raised this same concern, I decided that the issue of Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization needed some attention. So, I introduced legislation to abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Needless to say, that bill was going nowhere, but it did get people's attention, and it did help start the debate on the need for reform.

More importantly, I got involved with this issue on the House Armed Services Committee, working with other Members and Staff who had an interest in this area. Former Congressman Dick White of Texas had held a series of often sparsely attended hearings on the subject, along with a House Armed Services Committee staffer who I like to refer to as a national treasure—Archie Barrett, a retired Air Force Colonel who had published a study on Defense Reorganization. The contributions of this outstanding American in this area are immeasurable. I am very pleased that Archie is with us today because if any of you have tough questions, he can answer them. When Congressman White retired, I inherited Archie and the issue.

As you might expect, many of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense were opposed to any reform or reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including Defense Secretary Weinberger, General John Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and indeed every member of the Joint Chiefs. If you know your history, you will not be surprised to learn that the Navy was especially opposed. Then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman called me an "arm chair strategist" in a Washington Post op-ed article. He didn't mean it as a compliment. Then Vice Admiral Frank Kelso lectured me like a school boy when I visited Norfolk. "You don't know what you are doing," he told me.

We did have some strong support from within the active and retired military, however, including General David Jones, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shy Meyer, the former Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Harry Train, former CINCLANT. There were even some within

the Navy with opposing views. After Admiral Kelso's lecture, his boss, Admiral Lee Baggett, the CINCLANT, pulled me aside and privately told me, "you are doing the right thing."

Here are some of the problems that Congress discovered during our hearings on the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

The joint, or force employment, side of the DOD structure was weak and often ineffective. On the other hand, the service, or input, side of DOD was so strong that it regularly stepped beyond its mission of organizing, training, and equipping forces. The services tended to dominate the joint side, often to achieve parochial interests.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee, was collectively the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Service Chiefs were often unable to fulfill their dual-hat responsibilities. Decisions on the most fundamental national security issues were watered down or not given at all. It was General Taylor who testified that the Joint Chiefs often failed to answer the mail because the Chiefs could not resolve interservice disputes.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was only a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. If the Committee could not speak, or could only render watered-down pronouncements based on the lowest common denominator of agreement, the Chairman could only be an ineffective spokesman. One former National Security Adviser to the President stated that on a number of occasions he had witnessed the JCS Chairman unable to provide advice to the National Security Council on the most fundamental military issues of the day because the JCS had failed to develop collective advice. At other times, because the JCS Committee valued unanimity, the advice was so bland that it was of little value. One former Secretary of Defense stated that JCS advice was less than useless.

The Joint Staff was largely composed of non-competitive officers, often on their first staff tour. It was a dead-end assignment. The Joint Staff served the Chiefs collectively, and it was smothered with a thousand procedures that subordinated it to service positions. For example, every word of every Joint Staff paper—the source of formal JCS advice—had to be approved by every service before it could be submitted to the JCS for its consideration.

The Unified Commanders (the CINCS)—the Commanders of U.S. forces in the field on whom the nation would depend for its survival in case of hostilities—were tied down like Gulliver by constraints contained in JCS-issued directives.

The CINCS had few of the authorities you would expect a commander to possess:

They could not hire or fire their subordinate commanders or staffs.

They lacked Court Martial authority.

They could not employ their forces as they saw fit to accomplish their mission. Rather, they were required to employ forces only in accordance with service doctrine.

They did not control ammunition, food supplies, and the myriad other materials needed to conduct campaigns. Each service had its own line of supply.

Their authority over their subordinate service component commanders was very tenuous—the component commanders' principal loyalty was to their service.

Let's look at how these problems in the organization of the JCS before 1986 contributed to some of the failed missions I mentioned earlier:

In Vietnam, there were at least two land chains of command and four air chains of command reaching from the Pentagon to forces in the theater.

Desert One—the disastrous 1980 attempt to rescue hostages held by Iran—was conducted by forces of all four services. Those forces met for the first time during the operation, had never exercised as a joint team, and were led by multiple commanders responding to multiple chains of command.

In the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the serpentine chain of command wound through six layers of command, including officers from every service, before it reached the ill-fated Colonel commanding the Marine contingent on the ground—the Secretary of Defense; the CINC at Mons, Belgium; DCINC at Stuttgart, Germany; CINCNAVEUR with headquarters in both London and Naples; Sixth Fleet Commander in the Mediterranean; and the Naval Task Force commander off the coast of Lebanon.

The tragic Beirut bombing, with 241 U.S. casualties, was the event that really convinced many Members that Congress needed to find out what was wrong within the Department of Defense, and to take steps to correct the problems. The late Congressman Bill Nichols, a highly respected Member from Alabama, was especially galvanized by Beirut. Congressmen Hopkins, Aspin, and Kasich, as well as Senators Goldwater, Cohen, Nunn, and Levin, were also deeply involved in the legislation that eventually was named the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

You know the major provisions of the Act, so I will not go over them in detail. However, allow me to summarize the Act's effect:

Now, the JCS Chairman, not the Committee, is the principal military advisor, a role exemplified by General Colin Powell during Just Cause and the Persian Gulf War.

Now, the Joint Staff reports to the Chairman. It is composed of talented and qualified officers, and it is possibly the most powerful staff in the Department of Defense.

Now, the CINCS possess the requisite command authorities, as was so amply demonstrated by General Schwartzkopf in the Gulf War.

Of course, Goldwater-Nichols was not the sole cause of reversing the negative trend in operational performance since 1986. It is worth noting, however, that the U.S. Armed Forces have experienced fourteen years of outstanding success in conducting contingency operations since that year. Of particular note are Operation Just Cause in Panama and, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as I mentioned previously.

Finally, it is important to point out that it was not the goal of Goldwater-Nichols to weaken the services. To the contrary, Goldwater-Nichols was intended to push them firmly back into their legislatively assigned roles—organizing, training, and equipping forces to carry out the missions assigned to the CINCS. I do not know if Goldwater-Nichols has fully accomplished this objective, but it has made a difference.

#### PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

During 1988 and 1989, I was Chairman of the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed Services Committee. I have a confession to make—I did not want to get involved in studying Professional Military Education. I thought nothing could be more boring. Archie Barrett had to use his considerable powers of persuasion to convince that this area needed to be studied. I am glad that he was successful. The subject matter was fascinating, and I believe the work of the Panel was productive.

The Panel was formed because the House Armed Services Committee perceived little or no effort by DOD to comply with a key provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. That provision required DOD to examine the professional military education schools and make changes where necessary to ensure that officers were being prepared to participate with other services in joint operations and to serve in joint assignments.

The Panel visited every staff college, and every war college. We held a hearing at most of them, as well as hearings in Washington. After more than a year, we issued a comprehensive 200-page report that contained roughly 100 recommendations for changes in military education.

At this point, I had planned to discuss each of these 100 recommendations in detail. However, I know you all want to get home for dinner tonight, so I will only outline in brief what we found in regard to Navy PME.

First, the good news: We found that the Naval War College was hands-down the best service war college.

Next, the bad news: Naval officers attended at most only one year of professional military education whereas the other services took pains to ensure that their most competitive officers received two years. As a consequence, the intermediate PME course at Newport was almost an identical twin of other. I suggested that the Navy consider providing intermediate Professional Military Education at the Naval Postgraduate School. Moreover, in light of the pressing need for the officer corps of the future to be able to grasp the potential of new technologies to change the way wars are fought, and to understand how to employ technologically advanced weapons and equipment, I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations suggesting that an intermediate PME curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School, "could interweave the technological lessons that abound throughout military history with an appreciation of what technology offers today and a perspective of the future challenges facing officers in the post-industrial era."

Recently, I learned that the Navy is planning to offer its intermediate course at the Naval Postgraduate School starting later this year. This is a giant step in the right direction, and I am pleased that the Navy, at least in part, is taking my suggestion seriously. Eventually, I would really like to see the Naval Postgraduate School, in partnership with the Naval War College, be allowed to develop a genuine intermediate PME curriculum that uniquely integrates studies intended to increase technological literacy of the student officers with traditional PME.

#### CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by giving you a charge: Make the Armed Forces a better institution as a consequence of your service. During your careers, I urge you continuously to examine your consequence of your service. During your careers, I urge you continuously to examine your service, the joint military elements, and the Department of Defense from a detached, objective perspective. As you progress in rank, use your influence to rectify flaws where you find them. Many, perhaps most, of the problems discovered by Congress in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Professional Military Education had been identified in studies as far back as the 1950's. If DOD had acted—if senior civilian and military leaders had initiated needed changes—legislation would not have been required. Change was opposed by those who wanted to preserve narrow parochial interests. The result of that opposition

to change was, as mentioned before—Vietnam, Desert One, Beirut, Grenada. Do not allow your service, the joint military elements, or the Department of Defense to repeat the mistakes of the past during your watch.

The best way to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past is to commit to a lifelong study of military history. Consider how General Schwartzkopf used the lessons of history in at least three instances in his successful Desert Storm campaign:

First, the thorough 40-day air campaign which preceded the ground war recalls the failure to conduct adequate bombardment at the island of Tarawa in November of 1943. The price paid for that failure at Tarawa was heavy Marine Corps casualties. In the Gulf War, the ability of Iraqi forces to offer opposition to our forces was severely reduced.

Second, consider the successful feint carried out by the 1st Cavalry Division prior to the actual start of the ground war. This recalls Montgomery's strategy at the Battle of the Marne Line in North Africa against the German Afrika Corps. This action led up to the decisive battle at El Alamein.

Third, by utilizing a leftward flanking movement when he launched the ground war, General Schwartzkopf was taking a page from the book of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of Chancellorsville. As you will recall, Jackson's forces conducted a brilliant flanking maneuver and completely surprised Union forces under General Joseph Hooker, in the May 1963 battle.

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. God bless you, and I wish you all in your careers.

#### THE CROP INSURANCE EQUITY ACT OF 1999—COMPANION LEGISLATION TO S. 1108

#### HON. CHARLES W. "CHIP" PICKERING

OF MISSISSIPPI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1999

Mr. PICKERING. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity today to introduce companion legislation to S. 1108, the Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999, introduced by Senators COCHRAN and LINCOLN on May 24, 1999.

This legislation will effectively function to reform the problems farmers across the nation have encountered with the current infeasible federal crop insurance program. Participants in the federal crop insurance program will find that this legislation benefits farmers nationwide, not simply farmers in one region of the country.

The Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 requires that the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation re-evaluate current rating methods and processes used in rating crop insurance rates by September 30, 2000. In doing this, the rates paid by many farmers may be reduced through these new procedures. However, if it is found that through this reassessment rates would increase for farmers in certain geographic areas, the current rating system is to remain in place. In restructuring these rates, FCIC will begin its reassessment with those commodities with the lowest participation rate of buy-up coverage plans.

Currently, farmers who buy the highest levels of buy-up coverage receive the lowest levels of government premium subsidy. This is a direct link to the low percentage of farmers who purchase buy-up coverage in my state. The Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 will equalize all levels of buy-up coverage ensuring that all farmers, no matter what level of buy-up coverage they purchase, will receive equal assistance from the federal government in their purchase of buy-up coverage.

This legislation will further work to make federal crop insurance more appealing by establishing a system of discounts and other policy options from which farmers may choose. Farmers who effectively manage farm risk through good management practices which reduce the risk of an insurable loss will receive discounts toward premiums on their insurance coverage. In doing so, the federal crop insurance program will work in a manner like other forms of insurance. If a driver has a good driving record, he or she should justly pay premiums that reflect such. In the same manner, under this legislation, farmers who rarely file insurable losses will receive premium discounts under the pilot program established by this bill.

All farmers will benefit from the reform set by the Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 as this legislation raises the basic coverage level for catastrophic coverage, the lowest unit of crop insurance protection. Currently, this basic level of protection is completely free to the farmer and covers 50% of the grower's average production history at 55% of market price. This legislation will increase that basic coverage level to 60% of the farmer's average production history at 70% of the market price. Doing so will offer an ore feasible safety net to the producer should a loss be incurred.

Mr. Speaker, farmers in my home state of Mississippi assert that one of the primary problems faced by the current crop insurance program is that it is sometimes abused and exploited by farmers who seek to swindle the federal government at the expense of fellow producers. The Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 will reduce insurance fraud through imposing stiffer penalties for anyone, including insurance companies, agents, and producers, who participate in fraudulent activities.

This legislation will also protect new farmers or farmers who rent new land or decide to produce new crops by assigning them a fair yield until they are able to generate sufficient actual production data. In addition, farmers who encounter multiple year disasters will be protected by being assigned a yield equal to eighty-five percent of the county transition yield for any year in which the farmer's yield falls below that eighty-five percent level.

The Crop Insurance Equity Act of 1999 reforms the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation Board of Directors to include more farmers from different regions of the United States and creates an office to work with private insurance companies who develop new crop insurance products. The legislation goes further by reducing the amount of excessive underwriting gains received by these insurance companies.

Mr. Speaker, our agricultural producers are demanding a more feasible and more affordable federal crop insurance program. I believe that this crop insurance legislation is a sound